Public Procurement: Statements
Seanad Éireann — 2026-04-29
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Gerard P. Craughwell (IND), Labour Panel

The Minister of State is welcome to the House. Public procurement is one of the most powerful instruments of public policy in Ireland. Nowhere is it more evident than in the field of defence. The choices we make about where we source our equipment, technology and support systems shape not only our economic landscape but also our national security and our ability to act with confidence in an increasingly uncertain world. It will be no surprise to the Minister of State that I will focus mainly on defence today.
For a country like Ireland, militarily non-aligned yet carrying growing responsibility in maritime security, cybersecurity and EU mission defence procurement, it is not simply a matter of buying equipment but also about ensuring that what we buy remains reliable, sustainable and under Irish control throughout its entire life cycle. One of the greatest risks we face is over-reliance on a single supplier country. Such reliance can arise for understandable reasons, specifically efficiencies in training, maintenance and interoperability, long-standing diplomatic relationships and the convenience of dealing with a familiar partner. However, when too much of our capability comes from one external source, we expose ourselves to vulnerabilities that are strategic, political and economic.
The first vulnerability, the strategic dependency, is such that if our crucial capability depends on one country, our operational readiness becomes tied, whether we like it or not, to that country's political decisions and priorities. That is not just a technical risk; it is a political one. Across Europe, governments have had to rethink their reliance on single suppliers because political change, even in friendly countries, has already altered export policies and delivery priorities. This is why so many European states are diversifying procurement and rebuilding sovereign production capacity.
The second vulnerability is the risk of political change within the supplier state. Governments change, policies shift and export controls tighten.
A country that is a reliable partner today may, after an election or a geopolitical realignment, impose restrictions, delay deliveries or prioritise its own domestic needs. Even without hostility, such changes can disrupt supply chains that we expected to remain stable for decades.
Third, concentrated sourcing exposes us to supply chain disruption. Defence systems rely on continuous access to parts, software and technical expertise. Any interruption, whether caused by politics, industrial action or global events, can have immediate consequences for our ability to operate. The evidence is clear. Deloitte has warned that after decades of optimisation, global defence supply chains have become fragile, opaque and vulnerable to shocks ranging from pandemics to global political pressure. PwC describes global defence supply chains as “in turmoil”, with nations now competing for limited industrial capacity. In Sweden, major manufacturers like Saab and BAE Systems report severe production bottlenecks and long lead times because supply chains cannot keep up with demand.
A well-known case in France involves shortages of strategic raw materials, especially titanium, aluminium and nickel, some of which historically came from Russia. After the invasion of Ukraine, sanctions and countersanctions disrupted these supplies. French manufacturers including Dassault Aviation and Safran reported that several SMEs in their supply chains were in serious difficulty because of these disruptions, threatening production rates for military equipment such as aircraft engines and airframe components. Two factors make the problem worse. The first is a heavy dependence on subcontractors. For example, Safran receives 65% of the parts for its LEAP engines from external suppliers, making any disruption critical. The second factor is longer lead times and industrial saturation. The surge in orders linked to the war in Ukraine has stretched French industrial capacity, so any supply chain shock becomes even more problematic. For an island nation with unique maritime and airspace responsibilities, these are not theoretical concerns; they are practical ones.
Fourth, there is the question of our own industrial and technological base. Ireland may not be a major defence manufacturer, but we have real strengths in engineering, technology and advanced services. If procurement is focused entirely abroad, we underuse those strengths, we miss opportunities for innovation and we fail to build the domestic capacity that strengthens national resilience. We already see examples of what Ireland can do. In Shannon, Irish companies are developing advanced drone technologies with global applications, which is proof that we have the talent and the industrial capability to contribute meaningfully to national security. The Irish Defence and Security Association, representing firms across cybersecurity, aerospace, engineering and advanced manufacturing, has repeatedly highlighted the potential for Irish industry to play a larger role in supporting national capability. These are assets we should be leveraging, not overlooking.
This is especially important now, as Ireland moves to double its defence budget to €3 billion, with plans for a 12-ship Naval Service fleet, new armoured vehicles, a military intelligence school, a 300-person cyber corps and even a future fighter aircraft capability. These investments demand secure and reliable supply chains.
We must be honest with ourselves. Ireland has seen the consequences of weak procurement governance in other sectors. The national children's hospital, which was originally costed at under €1 billion, has become the most expensive healthcare project in the world, with costs escalating far beyond initial estimates. The search and rescue aviation contract has also faced significant scrutiny, with legal challenges, delays and questions over process and oversight. These examples are not about defence, but they demonstrate the simple truth that when procurement goes wrong, it goes wrong for years and the State pays the price. Defence procurement cannot afford those mistakes. That is why it is essential that defence procurement supports Irish industry and Irish jobs. Suppliers should be required to maintain some level of manufacturing, assembly or high-value industrial activity within the State. This is not protectionism; it is prudent policy that ensures public spending contributes to our own economic resilience, anchors key capabilities at home and builds a sustainable industrial ecosystem that can support our defence needs over the long term.
Europe is moving in the same direction. Under the ReArm Europe and Readiness 2030 initiatives, more than €800 billion is being mobilised to rebuild Europe’s defence industrial base and reduce reliance on external suppliers. Countries across the Continent are onshoring production, especially the production of ammunition and critical components, because they have learned the hard way that relying entirely on foreign production is no longer viable.
How do we respond to these challenges? First, we must make diversification a core strategic objective. We do not abandon key partners, but we avoid excessive concentration. Working with multiple suppliers reduces risk and increases flexibility. Second, we must structure procurement contracts to protect national autonomy. This means securing access to maintenance, ensuring we have the rights to adapt and upgrade systems, and embedding domestic industrial participation wherever feasible. Local manufacturing and long-term maintenance capacity are not luxuries; they are safeguards. Third, we must align our procurement strategy with broader European frameworks. EU collaboration offers opportunities to diversify supply, strengthen partnerships and operate within a stable political and regulatory environment. Fourth, we must maintain strong governance and oversight. Defence investments last decades. They must be evaluated rigorously with explicit consideration of geopolitical risk, including the risk of political change in supplier states. Finally, we must adopt a full life cycle approach. The real vulnerabilities often emerge not at the moment of purchase, but years later when systems need upgrades, parts or technical support. Domestic industrial capacity is one of the best tools we have to ensure continuity throughout that life cycle.
International partnerships will always be essential to Ireland's defence, but over-reliance on any single supplier introduces avoidable risks that are magnified in a world where political change can alter the terms of engagement overnight. A diversified and strategically governed procurement system that supports Irish industry, protects Irish jobs and strengthens Irish autonomy is not just good policy; it is an expression of our sovereignty and our responsibility to future generations.
Having said all of that, the Minister of State's Department has played a crucial role in Ireland since the financial crash. I know he was elected soon after that crash. The Department plays an important role but the oversight sometimes involves too much micromanagement. It should be more like macromanagement, particularly in the areas where we are about to spend massive amounts of funds. I thank the Minister of State for his time. This is my first time to address him since he got promoted. I am delighted to see him here as a former Member of this House.

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Record URI: https://data.oireachtas.ie/akn/ie/debateRecord/seanad/2026-04-29/debate/main
Retrieved: 2026-08-14T04:54:52+00:00
Sitting date: 2026-04-29