Prohibition of Lethal Autonomous Weapons Systems Bill 2026: Second Stage
Seanad Éireann — 2026-06-17
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Catherine Ardagh (FF), Dublin South-Central

I thank all the Senators who contributed to the debate. I particularly thank Senator Alice-Mary Higgins and the Civil Engagement Group. I have known the Senator for a long time. She has been at the forefront of discussions and legislation relating to peace and disarmament in this House as well as non-proliferation. Many Senators raised the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, the Convention on Cluster Munitions, and the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention. All the legislation cited relates to international conventions and treaties that Ireland played a lead role in and are the result of years of international negotiations. Senator Higgins noted her involvement in the Convention on Cluster Munitions. In relation to what we are doing on an international and EU footing, we are again seeking to play a leading role internationally in driving agreement on the prohibition of lethal autonomous weapon systems.
There is significant consensus across the House relating to the aims and goals of the Bill. Ireland regards the control of LAWS as one of the most pressing issues facing the modern arms control agenda. Their development and deployment raise serious ethical, moral and legal questions and the possibility of contravening international humanitarian and human rights law. The use of such systems to identify, select and engage targets without any or nominal human involvement is fundamentally incompatible with international humanitarian law and the principles of distinction, proportionality and precaution that underpin it.
The Government strongly believes that there is a need to maintain meaningful human control of all weapons systems, including any systems that may be developed. Our position is that, for such systems to comply with international humanitarian law, context-specific and value-based judgment by human beings is required and, therefore, the retention of human command and control is critical. Systems that do not incorporate such human command and control must not be developed, must not be deployed, and must not be used. A point made by Senator Stephenson was that you cannot bring a robot to court.
Ireland is active, alongside like-minded partners, in seeking to establish international law in relation to lethal autonomous weapons systems. The primary forum for these efforts is the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons, CCW, and its group of governmental experts on lethal autonomous weapons systems in Geneva. The approach and elements for any future international instruments are still being developed and efforts are at a delicate stage. Ireland has been influential in helping to shape this process. We are actively engaged in seeking a progressive outcome to its existing mandate, which concludes in November. Its mandate is to agree a set of elements of a future international instrument governing LAWS, without prejudice to its nature. Many states, including Ireland and its EU member state partners, are seeking a two-tiered approach of prohibitions on systems that cannot be used in compliance with international humanitarian law, and regulations on others with appropriate safeguards.
In addition to the process ongoing in Geneva, Ireland has been active across a range of international fora seeking to ensure ethics and human rights are respected in emerging military technologies. Along with all other member states, we supported the 2024 Political Declaration on the Responsible Military Use of AI and Autonomy. Ireland has participated in all responsible artificial intelligence in the military domain summits in the Netherlands in 2023, Korea in 2024 and Spain in 2026. Ireland has also engaged and supported research and discussions between states, international organisations, civil society and academia on addressing and mitigating bias in the use of Al, including in the context of discussions on lethal autonomous weapons systems.
Addressing these systems and the wider issue of AI in the military domain, is a cross-government issue. Officials from the Departments of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Defence, Enterprise, Tourism and Employment and the Defence Forces are working collaboratively to advance Ireland’s progressive stance. This is something they will continue to do as the use of relevant systems continues to grow and the need for guardrails becomes ever more clear. In the Government’s view, it is essential that the broadest possible number of states come to agreement on what relevant terms surrounding these weapons systems mean. This should naturally further lead to agreement on the actions that need to be taken to ensure compliance of such systems with international humanitarian law across their entire life-cycle, including design, development, employment and deployment.
That brings me to our debate this evening. I thank Senator Higgins for her contribution to the developing public debate in Ireland on these emerging weapons systems and on the use and potential abuse of AI in the military domain. These are questions of vital importance that touch on questions of international law but also on public morality.
As a republic founded on values and a commitment to upholding international law, including international humanitarian law, and as a country with a long and proud track record of promoting disarmament, arms control and non-proliferation, the issues that the Senator raises demand our attention. I acknowledge the work of Senator Higgins and the other sponsors of this Bill in seeking to raise awareness and advance public debate on these issues. I acknowledge also the contribution that the sponsors are making by initiating consideration in these Houses of appropriate legislative and regulatory responses that we should seek to put in place as a country in response to these developments.
The Government understands and shares the motivation for this Bill grounded as it is in humanitarian principles for which Ireland has been a long-standing international champion. The Government shares the view that autonomous weapons systems that cannot be used in compliance with international humanitarian law and the principles of distinction, proportionality and precaution need to be prohibited. We also want to see clear regulations on those that can through meaningful and effective human command and control. These are fundamental principles that are shared across this House.
It is the Government's view, however, that while we do not oppose this Bill, we believe it is premature to seek national legislation before the necessary international agreement is first put in place on core concepts, including essential legal definitions. These legal definitions are an essential basis for legislation that can successfully address the range of complex legal and regulatory issues raised by this Bill. There are a number of issues which form the basis of our position. I will set them out carefully for the House.
Regulating lethal autonomous weapons systems requires comprehensive and detailed work to establish rules around the full life cycle of these systems. A large body of international experts are currently working to establish common international definitions on autonomous weapons systems, as well as broader uses of AI in the military domain. As I have mentioned, the Government is actively engaged in these efforts. Any national legislation would need to accord with international understandings when they are in place. This is important for a number of reasons.
The breadth of both the definitions and the reference to "components" of autonomous weapons systems in the Bill would be likely to bring a broad range of commercial products within its scope such that it would be potentially un-implementable in practice as currently framed. These are the dual-use products discussed by Senator Higgins. The fact that the Bill is proposing to create criminal offences in this respect also underlines the need for precision and certainty when seeking to introduce prohibitions of this nature.
When we have previously created national legislation with respect to arms control, we have done so on the basis of relevant international agreements, which contain widely agreed and understood legal concepts, terms and definitions. This has been the case in respect, for example, with regard to the Cluster Munitions and Anti-Personnel Mines Act 2008.
By contrast, this Bill seeks to prohibit autonomous weapons systems on a stand-alone basis rather than under the auspices of a dedicated international instrument. In so doing, it seeks to introduce and establish a definition of and prohibition on "autonomous weapons systems" that does not have international consensus. Furthermore, it comes at a time when Ireland is actively engaged in the dedicated international forum at the UN seeking to achieve consensus on the key elements of a potential future international instrument.
Ireland believes the elements identified through that UN process in what is called the rolling text maintained by the chair of the UN group of governmental experts provides a sufficient basis to move to negotiations on a legally binding instrument. Indeed, this Bill includes some elements of language that has been included in versions of that rolling text itself. While the Government’s focus is on trying to help secure a mandate for negotiations of an instrument, we also recognise that finding consensus will be a significant challenge at a time of low international trust and high international tensions. Some states will prefer a non-binding series of guidelines to complement existing obligations under international humanitarian law. Others may wish to keep the discussion going on definitions with no clear end. The Government is fully aware of the challenges and is preparing for different eventualities that we may be faced with after the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons, CCW, review conference in November. Ireland is ambitious in its approach and is working to secure the best outcome in these negotiations.
Enacting national legislation now without knowing the agreed approach to regulating lethal autonomous weapons systems at the international level could pre-empt the outcome of the ongoing UN process. The difficulty in proceeding on a stand-alone basis is illustrated by the fact that the Bill proposes to prohibit lethal autonomous weapons systems by reference to a definition of "autonomous weapons systems" that does not fully accord with the current working international definition or the Government’s aim of prohibiting some systems and regulating others.
It is instructive to consider the experience of other jurisdictions. Elsewhere, some parliaments have agreed resolutions on the need prohibit and control autonomous weapons systems. Iceland was the first state to pass a parliamentary resolution in 2016 expressing support for a ban on the production and use of what it characterised as fully autonomous weapons systems. Notably, the resolution called on the government to monitor the issue at the UN and other international fora. In Belgium, the issue has been somewhat recurring in recent years with parliamentary sessions to discuss and debate adding such systems to the country’s list of prohibited weapons through national legislation. No such effort has succeeded, although supportive parliamentary resolutions have been passed. Ultimately, states have uniformly recognised the importance of seeking an international agreement. At present, many states rely on instituting rules on the use of autonomous systems through military policies or doctrines to align with their obligations under international humanitarian law. How they interpret those rules and compliance may vary thereby highlighting the issue with individual solutions to collective problems.
I will highlight some examples in the Bill to illustrate the definitional challenge. To begin with, the use of the word “lethal” to describe relevant autonomous weapons systems has been contested over the years, including by Ireland, as lethal does not suggest a system that can injure or cause damage to a civilian object - any object that is not a military objective. By way of compromise, there is now a provisional working characterisation in the current version of the UN rolling text to broaden the scope to encompass injury and damage. It states that "a lethal autonomous weapon system can be characterized as ... a combination of one or more weapons and [functionally integrated] technological components, that can identify, select, and engage a target, without intervention by a human" operating the system. The characterisation further states that it does not exclude systems that have been developed or programmed by humans and have the ability to determine potential targets from preprogrammed profiles. Similarly, a system is not excluded if it does not result in loss of life or cause damage or destruction to objects. What is within or outside scope of a future agreed definition is for future negotiation.
By contrast, this Bill on lethal autonomous weapons systems defines those very systems in a way that is narrower than that being proposed at the international level. It is, therefore, different to existing international understandings. This highlights the core of the definitional challenge, which has meaningful implications. Criminal penalties, which are proposed in the Bill, would not be enforceable without clearly understood or international agreed definitions.
The Bill references prohibitions on the transport or transfer of components of an autonomous weapons system within the jurisdiction of the State. This would go well beyond existing international proposals and would likely prohibit a wide range of material and intangible systems, both hardware and software, that could be used for everyday commercial ICT purposes or legitimate military purposes under appropriate controls. I do not believe that is the intent of the Bill but it could well be the effect with far-reaching implications for industry and the defence of the State. It is unclear how in practice one would control the acquisition or disposal of pre-products given examples of such items include technologies with regular civilian uses.
With regards to elements of the Bill that seek to prevent the use of public moneys for lethal autonomous weapons systems, this is something Ireland has successfully pushed for at the EU level. For example, actions ineligible for EU funding under the European defence industry programme, EDIP, include those related to lethal autonomous weapons systems that operate outside a responsible chain of human command and control or that cannot be used in compliance with international humanitarian law. This is a position we are continuing to carry forward on a principled and legally consistent basis as EU programmes evolve to match the critical security environment in Europe.
While the absence of international consensus on core definitions poses challenges for legislation nationally, I reiterate that the Government broadly supports the motivation behind the Bill, which is why we are working assiduously to find a comprehensive international solution. This will remain the Government’s objective. The Government recognises the urgency of controlling the use of autonomous weapons systems and is at the forefront of international efforts in that regard. We will continue to work with like-minded partners drawing from the expertise of academia and civil society partners towards an ambitious and comprehensive international solution and on that basis, to advance efforts to address the legal, humanitarian and ethical issues presented by lethal autonomous weapons systems. National-level discussions that have due regard to international developments can complement this ongoing work. The Government is open to engagement at national level, including with the sponsors of this Bill, while these international efforts continue with a view to achieving an ambitious and robust outcome that will lay the foundations for future work.

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Record URI: https://data.oireachtas.ie/akn/ie/debateRecord/seanad/2026-06-17/debate/main
Retrieved: 2026-08-14T04:55:04+00:00
Sitting date: 2026-06-17