Criminal Justice (Terrorist Offences) (Amendment) Bill 2025: Committee Stage
Seanad Éireann — 2026-06-30
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Catherine Ardagh (FF), Dublin South-Central

I thank the Senators who put this amendment before the House and made contributions today. I understand the genuine questions raised by Senator Higgins. Some were rhetorical and some were genuine, but I understand the point being made.
This amendment seeks to delete the phrase "public provocation to commit a terrorist offence" from the definition of terrorist-linked activity in section 2 of the Bill. The effect of this amendment would be to remove public provocation as an offence under the Bill. Noting the concerns around the public provocation offence, the Minister, Deputy O'Callaghan, committed to reflecting on the wording of this on Committee Stage in the Dáil and sought further advice from parliamentary counsel on the proposed changes.
Parliamentary counsel confirmed the necessity for the restructuring of this offence, both from a compliance perspective and to add greater safeguards as to its interpretation and use. The purpose of this legislation is to give full effect to the provisions of a 2017 EU directive on combating terrorism that are not already provided for in Irish law. Article 5 of the directive requires that public provocation to commit terrorism be criminalised.
As mentioned on previous Stages, the amendment of section 4A of the principal Act does not create a new or separate offence of public provocation by way of glorification, nor does it make unduly vague and expansive. Rather, the amendment clarifies that the scope of the public provocation offence is such that it can include public provocation by way of the glorification of terrorism. This clarification stems from the requirements of Article 5 of the 2017 EU directive. The clarification does not change the substantive offence and provocation by way of glorification is encompassed in the offence as it currently stands. Its explicit reference now in the amendment is an exercise in clarity and compliance.
Section 3 of the Bill also reformulates the wording of the offence provision more generally to give clarity to the elements necessary for a prosecution of public provocation. This serves to safeguard the offence from abuse and misuse. The current wording in the principal Act reads:
“4A. For the purposes of this Part, public provocation to commit a terrorist offence means the intentional distribution, or otherwise making available, by whatever means of communication by a person of a message to the public, with the intent of encouraging, directly or indirectly, the commission by a person of a terrorist activity.”
The revised section 4A as proposed by this Bill provides:
“4A. For the purposes of this Part, a person publicly provokes the commission of a terrorist offence if—
(a) he or she, with the intention of inciting persons to commit a terrorist activity, distributes or publishes, or causes to be distributed or published, by any means (including via the internet) to the public or a section of the public a message—
(i) inciting, or that could reasonably be construed as inciting, persons to commit a terrorist activity, or
(ii) that glorifies (including by praise or celebration) a terrorist activity,
and
(b) such distribution or publication gives rise to the reasonable apprehension that the commission of a terrorist activity could thereby result.”.
Parliamentary counsel confirmed that the revised text affords greater protection to someone exercising their right to freedom of expression than the current section 4A. The current section 4A simply refers to the publication of a message. It does not say anything about the nature or content of the message. The only thing that makes the publication of the message criminal under the current section 4A is the intent of the publisher. Proof of that on its own will not be sufficient to secure a conviction under the reframed section 4A. Furthermore, the publisher of the message must not only intend to incite the commission of a terrorist offence, but the published material must give rise to a reasonable apprehension that a terrorist act could result. The latter element is also absent from the current section 4A.
In summary, the proposed new section 4A contains two new safeguards that are not present in the current version of section 4A:. The message itself must reasonably constitute an incitement to commit a terrorist activity as defined in the Act, or to glorify a terrorist activity as defined in the Act when objectively tested. The publication of the message must give rise to a reasonable apprehension that someone might, as a result of such publication, commit a terrorist act. Paragraph (b) is also an objective test.
The use of a reasonableness test is an objective legal standard used in law to prevent arbitrary or irrational interpretation, assessing circumstances against a hypothetical reasonable person's response or action.
These ingredients serve to act as safeguards, ensuring that it is only those who set out deliberately to incite terrorist activity and it is reasonable to assume that a terrorist activity as defined in the Act would result are captured by this offence.
The high standard of proof contained within the reframed section 4A ensures that a person's fundamental rights such as freedom of expression and association - to be allowed carry a Bobby Sands banner - are protected, and situations do not arise where activities that are otherwise lawful are considered as falling within the scope of this section.
Senators Higgins and Murphy just raised a case that arose in the UK and the legislation in the UK. Thankfully, the law in England and Wales is different from ours. This legislation will be different. There is a marked difference between the two statutory provisions in question. In Ireland, we are proposing section 3 of the Bill, which reformulates the definition of public provocation offence and what exists under section 13 of the Terrorism Act in England and Wales. Under the legislation in England and Wales, there is no requirement for a person's act or behaviour to carry with it the intention of seeking to cause the committal of a terrorist offence. It is much broader than that, simply requiring that in a public place a person wears or displays an article that would arouse suspicion that the person is a supporter of a proscribed organisation. Let us contrast that with section 3 of this Bill, which carries a much higher burden of proof to bring about a successful prosecution for the offence of public provocation to commit a terrorist offence by glorification. It must be shown that the person possessed the requisite intention of inciting persons to commit a terrorist activity when he or she distributed, published or caused to be distributed or published a message inciting or glorifying, including by praise or celebration, a terrorist activity. It is also a requirement of the offence that such distribution or publication must give rise to the reasonable apprehension that the commission of a terrorist activity could thereby result. These additional elements serve to act as safeguards in ensuing it is only those who set about to deliberately set about to incite terrorist activity and, where it is reasonable, a terrorist activity would result, are captured by the offence. I cannot support the amendments.

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Record URI: https://data.oireachtas.ie/akn/ie/debateRecord/seanad/2026-06-30/debate/main
Retrieved: 2026-08-14T04:55:07+00:00
Sitting date: 2026-06-30