I am saying that the Attorney General argued the exact contrary to the majority decision of the Supreme Court. Let us be 100% clear. The Government's position was that this is compatible with the Constitution. The majority of the Supreme Court said it is not. For some reason, the majority, including those who thought it was constitutional, then subscribed to an obiter dictum stating that if the Arbitration Act 2010 was amended in a particular way, that would cure all the difficulties. With respect, that logic is deeply flawed.
I will make a second point in that regard, which has been made just recently. There was no pre-legislative scrutiny of this Bill. Expert lawyers were not brought in to advise the committee or the Irish public as to what the implications of this Bill would be. No expert opinion was received, for instance, as to whether the Court of Justice of the European Union would say that this was fine. No experts in law were brought in to discuss that issue before the committee whose duty it is to discuss legislation such as this. Instead, the Government said that the matter was urgent and that pre-legislative scrutiny would be a waste of time. It is not urgent for the very reason that France and Italy and other countries are not going to ratify it. The only urgency I can see is the impending visit of Prime Minister Carney.
The Minister of State indicated that this would be the first time that a collective agreement was not ratified by the member states and therefore lapsed. If the member states, including Ireland, in their wisdom say that they are not interested in the arbitral courts aspect of this agreement and would prefer, on balance, that it were not there, that decision would not herald the end of the world. It may cause a flutter in Iveagh House. We have to be at the centre of European affairs. We do not want to be peripheral. We do not want to join this country or that country. We want to be right up there waving our little European flag. It will make no difference whatsoever if the parties to the CETA agreement have to go back and excise from the agreement the arbitral court provision, or at least allow the member states to opt in or opt out other than on the basis of a mass walkout by the EU or a member state ceasing to be part of the European Union.
The other thing about the Minister of State questioning me about criticising the obiter dictum set out in Mr. Justice Hogan's decision is this. Mr. Justice Hogan was not asked to decide that point, nor were any of the other judges asked to decide it. This was a volunteered opinion. It was not the function of the former Deputy Costello's case to work out ways to ratify CETA. I make the following very simple political point with a degree of foreboding. Supposing Sinn Féin, the Labour Party, the Social Democrats, the Green Party or whoever else were in government. Would it be the function of the Supreme Court to start telling those parties, which are opposed to CETA, "This is the way you can do it, folks."? Of course it would not. That underlines the fact that I have the gravest reservations about an obiter dictum of that kind being enunciated by members of the Supreme Court as if it was self-evident that a responsible court would tell the Government how it could ratify CETA instead of doing what it was asked to do by Patrick Costello, which was to say that it is not compatible with the Constitution as things stand. This is the first time I am aware of where someone has ever said that an Act of Parliament of this kind could, if enacted, and as advised in the vaguest of terms, cure a constitutional difficulty for the Government in this way.
The funny thing about Mr. Justice Charleton's decision is that he had one great advantage. He spoke last in the delivery of judgments. I do not mean that he enunciated his judgment last. Rather, I mean that his judgment was written after he had read all the judgments of the other judges. At paragraph 9, he began listing the reasons for his dissent:
9. Ireland has a legislature. Ireland has a judiciary. Both may make mistakes but neither are unworthy of trust, either by an investor in business from Ireland or Canada or from any other country. [Hear, hear.] Experience in commercial litigation over many years demonstrates that nationals of Ireland or of any other country are treated equally by the judiciary. Experience of living in this country establishes that the legislature does not engage in abusive legislation against foreign investors.
10. CETA sets up a supra-legislative body through the Joint Committee, with unlimited powers of interpretation of a vague set of principles within the treaty. The Joint Committee makes new laws. These override the exclusive law-making powers of the Oireachtas. That process is in no way democratic.
11. The CETA tribunal and appeal tribunal may overturn a decision of any Irish or Canadian court on the basis of such elastic concepts as discriminatory or unfair conduct and such concepts may be stretched without limit through ordinary tribunal interpretation or through rulings of the Joint Committee. That is to set up a supra-national legislature and a system of final adjudication by persons appointed as tribunal members which is extra-judicial and above the untainted judicial systems of Canada and Ireland.
12. CETA tribunal awards will be automatically enforceable in the High Court in Ireland and in Canada. In Ireland the discretion, on constitutional grounds, for refusing to enforce what are likely to be gigantic awards is so vanishingly small as to be reduced to nothing. That is, as the law now stands. When the CETA treaty is fully ratified enforcement of those extra-judicial awards becomes a necessitated obligation of EU member membership and vanishes altogether.
That is what he says. By the way, nobody in this House, not even the Minister, will contradict him on that. Nobody will. He goes on to say:
The majority posit that a potential solution is the amendment of the 2010 Arbitration Act to expand the grounds for judicial refusal to enforce a CETA award. The grounds for that legislative change cannot override the necessitated obligation of European Union membership. Even if that were legally possible, to have a discretionary ground for refusal to enforce a CETA tribunal award would operate as a fundamental contradiction of the treaty itself. Even the insertion, at this stage, of a protocol based on the protection of the constitutional tradition of Ireland would be so far reaching as to fundamentally contradict the CETA treaty itself; something impossible under the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (1969).
I would like to hear somebody say he is wrong on that. We hear from the Government that the majority of the Supreme Court bashed ahead with Mr. Justice Hogan's obiter dictum .
Having made those arguments, Mr. Justice Charleton said the following. He was looking at all the judgments, including the people who said it was constitutionally possible to ratify CETA and the people who said that it was not. In paragraph 52 of his judgment, he states:
A majority of the Court holds that ratification (and it follows upon ratification by all the EU Member States, incorporation into Irish law) of CETA is not the proper exercise by the Government of its powers to engage in international relations under Article 29.4 of the Constitution. Automatic enforceability of CETA awards, leaving aside the diminution of legislative sovereignty under Article 5 and 28.2 [of the Constitution], the bypassing of the courts system under Article 34 and the finality of decisions of the Supreme Court under Article 34.5.6°, makes this system part of the “domestic law of the State” under Article 29.6 and this requires that this not be done “save as may be determined by the Oireachtas.” A majority of the Court proposes that an amendment to the Arbitration Act 2010 would bring into play a sufficient discretion whereby, were our constitutional order to be offended by either the nature of a CETA tribunal award or by the manner in which a rule of Irish law was elided in favour of a principle based on the vague assertions upon which such tribunals act, or whereby the ruling of the Joint Committee set up a rule of law inimical to national law, that a legislative provision widening judicial discretion in not enforcing such a finding domestically would suffice to give CETA constitutional validity.
53. Since that same majority, of which this analysis is part, holds that there is a clear disregard of the constitutional order, it is posited that a discretion to refuse the enforcement of a CETA tribunal award based on offence to constitutional principles, would cure the defects sufficiently to enable the adoption by the Oireachtas of CETA under Article 29.6 of the Constitution. That is not possible. Accession, on the one hand, including acceptance of the non-existence of defences to enforcement of CETA tribunal awards, and, on the other, to a wide statutory discretion to disagree and to disregard CETA tribunal awards bears the danger of becoming a constitutional β .
Protocol
54. It is appropriate to also doubt if qualified ratification of an international instrument, reserving by legislation a power to the Irish judiciary to override an award of the CETA tribunal, without the agreed and properly negotiated insertion of a protocol, such as Protocol 21 of the Treaty on European Union, which granted Ireland a “flexible opt-out to any proposals concerning the area of freedom, security and justice”, per the Law Reform Commission Discussion Paper ... modifying its terms in respect of that one signatory that would be necessary, would suffice.
55. That worry arises particularly in light of the requirement under Article 26 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (1969), which is under the pacta sunt servanda ... [in other words that agreements are to be obeyed], and adopts that ancient principle, requiring that every treaty is binding on parties, thus requiring the State to perform its obligations under CETA, in this instance, in good faith. As a matter of international law, the answer would realistically be predicted to be negative.
It is not just me saying that the ECJ, EU or my life savings are at issue here. Here is a judge of the Supreme Court saying that if this goes to be determined as a matter of international law, it will be worthless. It will be set aside. He states, "Any such amendment would seem to run contrary to the express requirement under Article 18 of the [Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties] VCLT, which provides that a contracting state “is obliged to refrain from acts which would defeat the object and purpose of a treaty”." That is the principle of international law. I am not inventing this, nor is Mr. Justice Charleton inventing this. This is what is generally understood to be international law. Article 19 states, and this is the important point, because we have just elicited from the Government that it intends to ratify without any reservation or protocol of any kind, which is why I had to insist on a clear answer to that question, "... reservations on the part of the State are permissible provided, per subsection (c), that the reservation is not “incompatible with the object and purpose of the treaty”. How would such a solution be compatible?" He is talking about Mr. Justice Hogan's solution here.
In paragraph 56, he states:
It is also notable that the Law Reform Commission states at [3.167] of the aforementioned discussion paper that the reservations entered by Ireland in respect of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights have been removed over time, thereby “increasing the scope of the State’s initial ratifications” and highlighting the limited impact of such restrictions on an international agreement of this kind. Further, the suggested solution is one of adaptation while at the same time qualifying the clear text of the instrument. Within the text of CETA the grounds for refusal of enforcement of a tribunal award are those already existing within the treaty. No other grounds of refusal are possible outside of a protocol within the agreement specifically qualifying the enforcement duty vis-à-vis Ireland.
57. Effectively, such an amendment to the 2010 Act would, in respect of CETA tribunal awards only, render the grounds for non-enforcement ones which contradict the terms of the treaty, which requires a level of enforceability that places those awards at the very least on the level of certainty of a commercial arbitration as between non-state actors. That is of course discounting the principle of the automatic application of European law.
That is the first thing he says. As a matter of international law, you could ratify subject to a reservation. Quite clearly, the Supreme Court's majority never considered whether Ireland could or could not do that. However, we are now told in this House, at an advanced stage of the legislative process, that there is no intention to do it. We intend on signing this cheque and saying effectively to our bank manager in a private note, or in private note in our own diary, that we may not honour that cheque. That is what we are doing in terms of international law.
He stated, in paragraph 58:
Even were this possible, there remain clear affronts to sovereignty. These amount to a clear disregard of the Constitution. Firstly, the power of amendment of CETA by the Joint Committee is not one where Ireland has any chance of democratic participation. Secondly, the interpretative power of the Joint Committee may confidently be predicted to add to, ameliorate, clarify, expand and refine the existing obligations of Member States under CETA. Thereby, what amounts to a denial of justice or due process in judicial proceedings, or a fundamental breach of transparency in judicial or administrative proceedings, or manifest arbitrariness, or abusive treatment of investors, or any unfair or inequitable treatment, may be moved from the chimera of legal ectoplasm into tangible rules.
In paragraph 59 he stated:
None of these rules will be anything that the people of Ireland or their democratic representatives will have debated and adopted through Article 15.2 and Article 5 of the Constitution. Thirdly, over time, and through the laudable principle of ascribing to consistency, both the tribunals of CETA at first instance and those on appeal will accrue much more than the acquis communautaire of the European courts. There, principles were developed from treaties grounded in certainty of law and derived from legislative acts and interpretations that over time displayed fundamental cornerstones that required identification and declaration. Here, under CETA, the process is [just] the opposite. Principles are given. No one knows what they mean. It is up to the Joint Committee to state what the rules are. Where those rules go is a matter for the Joint Committee and for tribunal interpretation. Instead of principles derived from law, we are given aspirations that become law outside the democratic process.
He goes on:
Nor should the power of investment capital be underestimated. States are buffeted by the vagaries of markets due to the necessity to sell bonds to borrow. The purchasing power of those forces prior to the economic crisis of 2007 has been vastly amplified due to the economic response at that time of near zero percent interest rates which has expanded wealth holdings. The nature of what is purchased may amount to great significance in terms of national assets. As [Ms Justice Dunne] states, rulings in contradiction of Irish law have consequent chilling effects.
This analysis by Mr. Justice Charleton came when he saw what the others were proposing. He saw what Mr. Justice Hogan was saying. He saw that a majority of the members were agreeing with Mr. Justice Hogan about the Arbitration Act. He never saw this Bill and nobody ever argued before him that this Bill and the terms of this Bill, as they are, render ratification of CETA constitutional.
It was not Mr. Costello's business to start advising proofs to the Government telling it that if it did this or that it would be all right. He was faced with the Government claiming that it can ratify without any changes in legislation or changes to the Constitution. It was then told that it could not because if it ratified CETA without at least qualification, it will breach the terms of the Constitution. So, he summarised his own position by stating that "Ratification of CETA by the Government is not now necessitated by Article 29.4.6°." I think we all agree on that. It is not a necessitated obligation.
Second, he stated that:
The powers of interpretation, amounting to the promulgation of law, based on vague principles of justice and the condemnation of arbitrariness ceded both to the CETA tribunal members and, the point assumes even greater force, to the Joint Committee [envisaged under the agreement] constitute the diminution of sovereignty which vests in the Oireachtas under Article 15.2 of the Constitution and offends against the guarantee in Article 6 of the Constitution whereby all powers of government derive from and are subject to the Irish people. The powers of interpretation given under CETA to the Joint Committee amount to the ceding of legislative sovereignty. These powers cannot be exercised on any democratic basis. These powers are without defined, or any definable, limit. Interpretations, amounting to the creation of laws, by the CETA Joint Tribunal cannot be appealed to any body, much less, as the Constitution requires, to the ultimate authority of the Irish people.
I will stop there to say that in Ireland, the people are sovereign. If these Houses want to ratify CETA in its present form, we can go to the people and ask them if we should do this. I can tell Members that if it went to the people, it would be thrown out on its ear. There is no chance that the Irish people would agree to this because they would take the common-sense view that everything is okay as it stands. Free trade is fine but we like to depend on our own courts in the last analysis to defend Irish interests and our own Legislature to do the same.
He goes on to say:
It is not just an alternative to the system of Courts under Article 34 of the Constitution which the tribunal, appellate tribunal and Joint Committee interpretative system sets up, but an actual contradiction of the express terms of the jurisdiction of the Irish courts and in particular the finality of the Supreme Court in terms of domestic law. The Constitution does not authorise or contemplate that there be such an alternative. While Irish law will be a matter of fact for the CETA tribunals, in reality through tribunal decisions a new system of law applying to Canadian investors in Ireland will arise.
Enforcement under the New York Convention and through the Arbitration Act 2010 will be automatic in execution of the express terms of CETA.
Even were that not the case, and some realistic residual discretion to refuse might remain, perhaps created by legislation as the majority propose, upon ratification by all Member States of the European Union and on bringing CETA into effect, all obligations, and in particular the obligation to enforce a tribunal or appellate CETA tribunal award in domestic law, will become necessitated under Article 29.4 of the Constitution...
Let us consider what he is saying. That is so crystal clear and so obviously correct. They will become necessitated obligations, and no Act of Parliament enacted before or after ratification changes what are or are not necessitated obligations or immunises any obligation from being necessitated or being enforceable under European law.
He says that once they become necessitated obligations under Article 29.4 of the Constitution and Article 4(3) of the Treaty on European Union, they will leave an Irish court with no discretion but to enforce. He states:
The interpretive power of the Joint Committee is not democratic and is one in which the Irish people do not participate. Ceding legislative sovereignty to the unlimited interpretive powers of the Joint Committee is a clear disregard of the Constitution.
The following is an important point, and this is what this House has to hear clearly, and I would like to see somebody contradict this paragraph. He states:
An amendment to the Arbitration Act 2010, such as is proposed by the majority of the court, is a contradiction of CETA and in addition to Government decision and legislation, will also require a specific protocol to the treaty as a matter of international law.
The Minister of State has just told Members that there will be no such protocol and no such reservation. We will sign the cheque without anything written on the front of it to say that we will not be honouring it in certain circumstances and rely on an independent third party to say that because we amended our Arbitration Act in 2026, we will get away that exception. It is rubbish. It is rubbish because the European Court of Justice, to whom this matter in theory and practice could be referred to by anybody who is dissatisfied with the decision of the Irish court, will say that it is sorry but Ireland ratified this treaty without reservation or protocol and that it is, as a matter of European law, bound by its terms.
They are necessitated obligations by virtue of Ireland's membership of the European Union and the supremacy of European Union law in European legal matters. It would state that Ireland must obey the court in Luxembourg and any attempt in 2026 to write into Irish statute law some kind of escape hatch or emergency cord for it to pull out of its obligations is invalid as a matter of European law. It is not only invalid as a matter of European law; it is invalid as a matter of international Vienna Convention law. I have not heard a single person say we can simply ratify this agreement in the way proposed.
Mr. Justice Charleton went on to state:
In effect, therefore, this analysis agrees with ... [the majority] that the appeal should be allowed because CETA constitutes a clear disregard of the Constitution. Disagreement arises with those judgments (and in addition with ... [the minority judgments]) [on the validity issue] insofar as they suggest that such constitutional disregard could be cured by amending the Arbitration Act 2010. That solution, giving judicial discretion to the High Court to refuse to enforce awards of the CETA tribunal is a contradiction of CETA itself; either with or without a protocol introduced into the treaty. Further, even if there was such a protocol, supposing it to be possible under international law, which is firmly to be doubted, refusal to enforce a CETA tribunal award on any grounds as to our constitutional tradition would clash with our European Union obligations and Article 29.4 of the Constitution. This would place such a judicial veto outside legal norms and beyond constitutional scrutiny.
That is the law properly exposed and stated, and it was done having taken a look at Mr. Justice Hogan's obiter dictum and pathway, to use the Minister of State's phrase. It was done analysing precisely what the effect of that would be. Nobody has come to the Supreme Court and said, "By the way, Ireland will not be writing this into the ratification. There will be none of that. We will just say, 'It is there', and we will rely on a totally improper statement of a legal kind. This is highly unlikely to arise and, therefore, because the Supreme Court showed us this vague pathway, it is all kosher." It is not. The Supreme Court never decided it. By the way, the Supreme Court now is differently composed from the Supreme Court that handed down that judgment. A number of the members are gone. I do not know what the newer members of the Supreme Court would make of the analysis of Mr. Justice Charleton, who is also gone, but I do know one thing: that his analysis would be put on the table of the courtroom in Luxembourg by the Commission and that its representatives would tell Ireland that its so-called solution is worthless.