I am happy to speak in support of amendments Nos. 4, 5 and 6. Am I correct that they are grouped? Yes. I will speak to each of them.
Amendment No. 4 reflects the concern that people have. This is the reason people and councils across the country voted in the past to express their concerns about CETA. It is the reason there has been such strong and consistent concern and opposition from civil society across the world about these arbitration tribunals. It is what is evidenced by how they have operated in the past. The Minister of State will say that the ICS is not sitting yet and we do not know what it will do. We know what every other arbitration body does and how it operates. We know there is nothing very distinctive to ensure we will not see the same effect. What Senator Clonan said was true. These were originally inserted as a grab by corporations.
I worked on these in the early 2000s when they were the European partnership agreements. This speaks to amendment No. 6 and to the international system, which is very exploitative and grants inequitable power to corporations and which the Government is choosing to tie us into. They were originally agreements imposed on African countries because European companies said they could not trust those countries' courts. Then corporations liked it. They thought it was wonderful to have their own court system that does not get tied up in any of the messy balancing-out of things like the public interest, environmental law and precedent. It does not have to weight all of that in. It simply looks to what corporations want discussed, which is how much compensation they should be awarded. They liked those in the European partnership agreement and started attaching them to other agreements.
Then the message came that countries with much longer experience of arbitration tribunals than ourselves saw that the damage they did to public interest was immense. That is why there was a push-back and why NAFTA, which contained arbitration, was replaced by a deal between the United States and Canada which does not include investor courts between those countries and requires in the case of Mexico that domestic courts be fully exhausted before, in very limited circumstances, a case can be taken. It is why South Africa has led the rejection of these kinds of tribunals, particularly after Italian companies sought to sue it for the impact of the end of apartheid. It is why there has been a rejection from Australia. There has been a huge rejection because those in civil society and others who warned about the potential dangers were correct.
Some reforms were then proposed. Those reforms were not spontaneously proposed by companies; they were proposed under duress by governments which had previously claimed the system was fine but were forced by pressure from civil society and others to institute reforms. They produced reforms that people are telling us about, including German court judges, the experts in civil society who identified the original problems and the IPCC - the highest climate body in the world - which has specifically named investor courts and arbitration tribunals as one of the significant blocks to achieving a liveable planet. The warning bells that were ringing are still ringing and the people ringing them are still correct. Many of the new generation of trade deals do not include these at all. Even Mercosur did not have them. The deal between the UK and the EU did not have them because they are toxic overreach by corporations who added these extra rights for themselves on top of a good thing we all want to see happening, namely, trade deals between parties.
Interpretive documents have been quoted at length - the parties agreed to this, the parties agreed to that - in relation to CETA, but we are discussing here any number of unknown future trade deals. The states engage. They are the ones who commit to working together on regulation, raising standards and so on. That is between the parties who sign up to the positive obligations in these. Corporations do not have to sign up to anything but they get a tool they can use to exert pressure. Corporations do not have to sign up to climate targets in order to use the investor courts to seek compensation for an environmental law that impacts them. It is a tool that gives corporation a stick with which to intimidate or press states in relation to their laws and it continues to be the same in CETA, which is just one of the agreements we are discussing and only one of the situations to which the Government is seeking to open the door.
The text in CETA is clear. We do not get to come back in multiple times so let us not circle around the mere fact of profit loss. It is not the mere fact of profit loss; it is profit lost due to your expectations being frustrated because you were unfairly or inequitably treated, which is exactly the language used in previous cases. The fact we provide a non-closed list of examples of unfair or inequitable treatment does not mean the same logics will not be used by other arbitrators. The evidence points to them being used. They are the precedents, even if they are in other courts, of unfair and inequitable treatment.
Here is what is in the text of CETA. This is something the Minister of State has never answered. This is why public interest is key. The Minister of State will say the State can legislate and has the right to regulate but the language in amendment No. 4 is "materially impair the capacity of the State to legislate or regulate in the public interest." Impairing the capacity of the State materially is adding an unknown future cost to regulation in the public interest and to the better choices we might hope future generations will make to address under-regulated areas such as housing and rental rights, care, many emerging areas of public health, the climate action that is needed, protection of biodiversity and digital regulation. When future governments representing future generations wish to legislate, this Government is choosing to add a new risk level to that law-making: it is the risk it might come with an unknown price tag attached and the risk that you might get sued.
The language of CETA - which, again, is not all that is being opened up here - is this: "When applying the ... fair and equitable treatment obligation, the Tribunal may take into account whether a Party made specific representation to an investor to induce a covered investment, that created a legitimate expectation, and upon which the investor relied in deciding to make or maintain the ... investment, but that the Party subsequently frustrated." This says that when the new tribunals - namely, the ICS - or the old tribunals under the old rules are weighing up and considering whether a company is entitled to compensation because of unfair and inequitable treatment, they will look to say, "Did you ask them to invest? Did you encourage them to invest?" These are things we should be doing but we are adding a risk that encouraging or asking them to invest, seeking to induce investments, creating expectations and then changing the law in a way that frustrates the expectation of profit the company had at the time it was invited to invest creates a vulnerability to that company taking and potentially winning cases for unfair and inequitable treatment. Parliamentary questions were put as to whether that vulnerability had been identified, properly considered and weighed up by Departments and I have received nothing about that. What we were told was a regulatory impact assessment had been done - full stop.
Going back to the core question of the material impact on the capacity of states to legislate or regulate in the public interest, it is not just that we have a vulnerability to cases being taken. There is the chilling effect we have heard about. There are multiple examples. We have given them again and again, including Vermilion, a Canadian company with strong interests in Ireland which took a case and diluted French climate law. These arbitration bodies are designed to chill laws. It is not an unfortunate side effect. CETA Article 8.39(3) states: "For the calculation of monetary damages, the Tribunal shall also reduce the damages to take into account any ... repeal or modification of the measure." If you repeal or modify the law, then we reduce the amount you have to pay. There could not be a clearer application of pressure against states. A state that is taken to court and has, as was said by Senator Conway, an award of hundreds of millions or possibly billions made against it, can get that bill reduced if it repeals the law, modifies the law or does what the corporations would like it to do.
That is a direct invitation to the compromising of the material capacity of the State to legislate and regulate, driven by the public interest, because it will come into a frame where there is the public interest on the one hand but then, on the other, there is the cost, the fact of that bill and whether we can get our bill from the corporation reduced. This is why it is a fundamental piece that we would, in terms of the enforcement of these awards, put in a break, so that where we see that it will materially impair the capacity of the State to legislate or regulate in the public interest, where we see that impact happening, and where the Irish courts, which, unlike these arbitration tribunals, can and do take into account international law, European law, environmental law, case precedence, constitutional precedent, the public interest and the full balance, see a public interest concern in the enforcement of an award, we would ask why we should have to support it. If the Minister of State does not believe there will be cases that impact on the State's capacity to legislate or regulate in the public interest, there is no reason not to put this in. If the Minister of State chooses to reject this amendment, he is choosing to reject a safeguard that literally says we do not want to see these awards being enforced when it compromises the State's capacities in terms of legislating in the public interest where it has a negative effect, where it has a chilling effect or where, even in the cost of an enforcement, for example, it maybe diminishes our Exchequer and affects our capacity to do other important things that we may wish to do.
Amendment No. 5 is clear in that these are the other really important things we sign up to. When the Minister of State talked about pooling our sovereignties and all of that, these are the things we have signed up to but they are not things that these arbitration bodies consider binding upon them. They are not under an obligation to say that you want compensation but the Convention on Biological Diversity says this and the Paris Agreement says that. They are not obligations in terms of the determining of awards. Certainly, arbitration bodies have been clear that they do not regard them as limiting on them. The 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, for example, the Aarhus Convention, the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, the conventions on the International Labour Organization and the Convention on Biological Diversity are really important because these are examples of the high points of our collective pooling of what we want for humanity and for how we live together in our countries and on this planet, but the teeth are not being given to these conventions or to their applications. The real teeth are being applied in relation to corporations and their entitlement to compensation. How many times have we raised concerns about the Aarhus Convention and concerns in terms of our Paris targets, which the Government seemed to be just accepting the fact that the 2030 agenda for sustainable development, which Ireland at a better moment in our history helped to negotiate, are not being met? At the same time, it can fail on those standards but the stick is being given to the corporations. The power is being given to the corporations and those who have the power to inflict monetary injury on the State take precedence over these international agreements which are actually the key to our collective future here on this planet.
On amendment No. 6, it is important to reaffirm, and the Minister of State has had it reaffirmed, that by tying us into this system, even with this pretend non-enforcement clause, this fig leaf, which Senator McDowell and others have said will not effectively work and which is almost designed not to work, we are tying ourselves in to the idea whereby we are choosing to give away the power to issue awards against us to a new quasi-legal body, a new arbitration tribunal. We are choosing to surrender the sovereignty of our own courts and saying that we give it the power to issue fines on us, to penalise us and to create awards which we may or may not then enforce, but we know that they will be enforced. In any case, we are also tying ourselves into a system which Ireland had largely managed to avoid, with the exception of the Energy Charter Treaty, which has had a chilling effect on legislation, which Ireland has been sued under and which countries all left because of the damage that it caused. We are tying ourselves into a system and not learning from all those examples I have listed: of South Africa, of Australia, of Canada and America, of Mexico, and of all of those countries right across the global south who have said "Never again" on investor courts or arbitration tribunals. We are choosing not to learn from that past but instead to tie ourselves into a system, which, by the way, is not limited to the investment court system, ICS, and this is in the Bill, which is explicitly clear. It is any arbitration. It says any trade deal that contains an arbitration mechanism. We are choosing to tie ourselves into that, and it can be enforced elsewhere, and we have seen that happen. That is not a hypothetical. I mentioned the Villa Spada. The Minister of State rolled his eyes. No, that is what has actually happened. That is what happened to Spain.